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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1965, Congress enacted Medicaid' in order to help states pro-
vide medical care to the poor.2 Unlike Medicare, 3 which is nation-
ally funded and administered, Medicaid is a program of
cooperative federalism; while the federal government funds a sub-
stantial portion4 of the state's medical assistance to designated
groups of eligible 5 persons, the administration of the program is
left largely to the state agency. 6 Consequently, the precise con-
tours of the program differ from state to state.7
The Medicaid program, hastily conceived as an adjunct to the
Medicare proposal,8 has never fulfilled its original promise: to
bring the poor "into the mainstream of medicine." 9 Placed into the
Social Security system, it has maintained its character as a pro-
gram of welfare,' 0 so the program has never been seen as analo-
gous to private schemes of health insurance. In addition,
subsequent amendments" have shifted the program away from
health care delivery and toward economic efficiency. Cost contain-
ment, not the provision of health care, has become the primary
concern of program administrators.
States enjoy broad discretion in shaping their Medicaid pro-
grams.12 As the federal government cuts back on its financial sup-
port,13 and as economic pressures build within states themselves,14
1. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343-423 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396j (1982)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
3. Id. §§ 1395-1395qq.
4. See infra note 37.
5. See infra note 33.
6. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
7. See M. PAULY, MEDICAL CARE AT PUBLIC EXPENSE 103 (1971). The variance in
each state program may be seen from a comparison of each state's plan in
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) § 15-501-660 (1983).
8. Butler, Legal Problems in Medicaid in LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH POLICY 217
(R. Romer & G. MacGray ed. 1980).
9. 2 Hearings on H.R.6675 before the Senate Fin. Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
653-54 (statement of Dr. Ralph C. Teall, M.D.).
10. See Butler, supra note 8, at 217.
11. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
12. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (upholding a state limitation
on the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program against
equal protection challenge: "the Constitution does not empower this Court to
second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocat-
ing limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients").
13. For a recent rundown of federal reductions in Medicaid funding, see Lang,
Developments in Health Care Law: 1981, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 719, 720
(1982). See also Semiannual Report of Inspector General Activities, April
1983-September 1983, MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 33,521 (1983)
(suggesting numerous cutbacks in order to reduce waste and fraud).
14. K. DAvis & C. SHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR ON POVERTY 87 (1978).
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state programs respond by reducing both the amount and types of
services available to eligible recipients. 15 This reduction in serv-
ices occurs at the same time that American medicine is experienc-
ing an explosion of technology. New methods of diagnosis and
treatment are being developed for diabetes,16 neurological disor-
ders,' 7 and handicaps of mobility;18 all these innovative techniques
could prolong life or significantly enhance the quality of life for
those who have access to them. If states continue the present
trend of reducing benefits for Medicaid recipients, the more ad-
vanced methods of diagnosis and treatment will not be incorpo-
rated willingly into a state's reimbursement plan. This emphasis
on fiscal concerns could freeze a state's approval policies and, in
turn, limit Medicaid recipients and their providers to only a few
traditional choices for treatment of a particular disorder.19
At the heart of the Medicaid program is an intent to provide its
recipients with "medically necessary care,"2 0 yet the legislative
scheme lacks both a substantive definition and a procedure
designed to arrive at a determination of what is, in fact, medically
necessary. Perhaps a substantive definition is neither desirable
nor possible. The concept of necessary medical care should be suf-
ficiently flexible to reflect the current state of medical art and,
therefore, a substantive legislative definition of the term could arti-
ficially confine the scope of permissible benefits. Also, judicial at-
tempts 2 1 at defining necessary medical care have been
inconsistent 22 and largely ignored.23 Even if a substantive defini-
tion is not required, a procedure for determining whether a partic-
ular treatment fits the current notion of necessary care is urgently
needed. Without a procedure accessible to recipients, necessary
care becomes only that which a state is willing to fund.24
15. P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH ASSOCIATIONS AND THE DEMAND FOR LEGISLATION: THE
PoLnwCAL ECONOMY oF HEALTH 34 (1977).
16. Mecklenberg, Clinical Use of the Insulin Infusion Pump in 100 Patients with
Type I Diabetes, 307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 513 (1983).
17. Fischer, Hyperbaric-Oxygen Treatment of Multiple Sclerosis, 308 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 181 (1983).
18. Dwosh, Giles, Ford, Plater, & Anastassiades, Plasmapheresis Therapy in
Rheumatoid Arthritis, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1124 (1983).
19. Kinzer, Massachusetts and California: Two Kinds of Hospital Cost Control,
308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 838, 839 (1983).
20. See infra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 57 and text accompanying note 69.
24. See Caper, Massachusetts'New Hospital Payment Law, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED.
542, 544 (1983). In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1979), Justice Marshall in
dissent contended that the state refusal to reimburse costs of abortions was
an "effort to deny to the poor the constitutional right recognized in Roe v.
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A determination of the necessity of medical care should reflect
careful consideration of two opposing interests: the recipient's in-
terest in securing the desired medical treatment and the state's in-
terest in maintaining the fiscal integrity of the program.25 Present
philosophy and procedural safeguards overwhelmingly emphasize
the latter.26
Mechanisms 27 exist to challenge a state agency's denial of reim-
bursement for the cost of a particular medical treatment, but they
are either inadequate,28 inaccessible, 29 or strongly biased in favor
of fiscal concerns. 30 This proposal for federal statutory reform at-
tempts to correct these inadequacies.
This Article will first review the Medicaid scheme, and identify
the limitations on the discretionary power of the state to restrict
coverage, the most important of which is the requirement that a
state provide medically necessary care. Existing statutory, regula-
tory, and judicial mechanisms for determining medical necessity
will be presented and critiqued. Finally, a proposed federal statu-
tory procedure will be presented and explained.
II. BACKGROUND: THE MEDICAID SCHEME
Medicaid is a program of federal assistance created to enable
each participating 3' state "as far as [is] practicable ... to furnish
medical assistance"3 2 to certain groups of needy persons 33 whose
income is "insufficient to meet the cost of necessary medical serv-
Wade, even though the cost may be serious and long-lasting health damage."
Id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. One author has identified the competing interests as the state's fiscal interest
and the state's interest in the health of its citizens. See Note, State Restric-
tions on Medicaid Coverage of Medically Necessary Services, 78 CoLUm. L.
REV. 1491, 1503 (1978).
26. Id. at 1504. The soaring costs of medical treatment have forced Congress to
hedge on originally promised goals, in favor of fiscal reality. See infra notes
63-68.
27. See infra notes 80-124 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
31. Participation in the program is voluntary. All states now have some form of
Medicaid assistance. For a detailed description of each state's plan, see
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 15,501-660 (1983).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
33. A state plan must cover the categorically needy, including those persons who
are eligible for benefits under Aid to Families With Dependent Children
(AFDC), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) (1982). A state plan may also provide
coverage for the medically needy, including those brought within eligibility
guidelines because of incurred medical expenses whose income does not ex-
ceed 133.33 percent of the maximum income level for coverage under AFDC.
Id. § 1396a(a) (10) (C).
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ices."3 4 In return for compliance with statutory requirements and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary35 of Health and Human
Services, 36 a participating state can receive reimbursement for up
to 80 percent 37 of the cost of providing medical assistance to eligi-
ble individuals.
Before a state receives funding under Medicaid, it must submit
a plan to the Secretary for approval.38 This plan must include,
among other things, the designation of a state agency responsible
for the administration of a program,39 procedures to insure a fair
hearing for recipients whose benefits are denied or terminated,40
and mechanisms to monitor the quality of care being given by
providers and institutions.41 Any deviations from federal require-
ments must secure prior approval from the Secretary.42 The Medi-
caid program, therefore, provides some uniformity of design and
administration.
The program imposes additional uniformity by requiring that
state plans must provide certain mandatory services to those
deemed categorically needy.43 Mandatory services include in-pa-
tient hospital services, out-patient services, laboratory and X-ray
procedures, physician services, certain skilled nursing care, and
any other medical or remedial care recognized under state law as
specified by the Secretary.44 Congress has never restricted or
eliminated any of these categories, despite the repeal of other stat-
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
35. The Secretary is empowered to promulgate rules and regulations "not incon-
sistent with this chapter, as may be necessary to the efficient administration
of the functions with which [he] is charged." Id. § 1302.
36. Formerly known as the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
redesignated by Act of Oct. 17, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 601, 93 Stat. 696 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982)).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2) (1982). Certain other administrative costs are reim-
bursed as well. These include the costs of processing claims, maintaining
peer review systems, and general administrative costs. Id. § 1396d. A state
can maximize this funding by vigorous anti-fraud and abuse programs, by
establishing a hospital cost review commission, or by proof that the state's
unemployment rate exceeds 150 percent of the national average. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
39. Id. § 1396a(a) (5). The agency can be autonomous or be part of an existing
state health or welfare agency. Whether the agency responsible for adminis-
tering the program is a health or welfare agency will affect the philosophy
and priorities of the program. See Butler, supra note 8, at 219.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (3) (1982).
41. Id. § 1396a(a) (9) (A).
42. Id. § 1396a(b).
43. Id. § 1396a(a) (10). States are free to offer optional services, id. § 1396d(a) (6)-
(16), to both the categorically needy and medically needy. Id.
§ 1396a(a) (10) (C).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1)-(5), (18) (1982).
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utory provisions relating to scope of benefits 45 and total annual ex-
penditures.4 6 These mandatory categories remain an important
benchmark in determining the type of medical care a state plan
must provide.
The Medicaid program, therefore, imposes certain basic re-
quirements on a participating state in the form of procedural obli-
gations and the categories of care that a state must provide.
Although a state has broad discretion to design its program, this
discretion is not absolute. Federal statutes and regulations impose
important limitations on the power of a state to limit the scope of
its medical assistance to the poor.
III. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE DISCRETIONARY
POWER
Medicaid legislation and regulations limit a state's discretion to
control the type of medical treatment a recipient can expect to re-
ceive. The first of these limitations is the statutory requirement
that a state plan must provide payment for certain mandatory
services.4 7 As noted before, the designated categories have never
been restricted or reduced. This indicates that Congress intended
that the mandatory nature of the services remain intact. More-
over, Congress anticipated an expansion of essential services in
the "catch-all" clause,48 which authorizes the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to designate additional types of services as
mandatory.
Second, each service which a state offers, whether mandatory
or optional, must be sufficient in amount, scope, and duration to
reasonably achieve its purpose.49 The court in White v. Beal5o ap-
plied this requirement to invalidate a state policy of providing the
optional service of prescription lenses only if the recipient suffered
from certain types of visual impairments. The court reasoned that
the purpose of providing prescription lenses was to correct visual
impairment, and if the state were to offer lenses as an optional
service, it had to reimburse the cost of the lenses for all recipients
45. See infra note 65.
46. See infra note 64.
47. See supra note 44.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (18) (Supp. V 1981). Examples of this final category in-
clude transportation services incident to medical care and Christian Science
nurses and sanitoria. 42 C.F.R. § 440.170 (1983). As long as the designated
service is recognized under state law as a legitimate health care provider, the
state must reimburse use of the service. See MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH) 1 17,497 (1983).
49. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1983).
50. 413 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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who suffered such impairment.5 1 The "amount, scope, and dura-
tion" requirement can thus impose a substantial limitation on the
state's ability to restrict the type of care given even under optional
services. 52
The third limitation on state administration of Medicaid bene-
fits is contained in federal regulations: a state cannot arbitrarily
limit coverage based upon diagnosis, type of illness, or condition. 53
If a state offers a service, either mandatory or optional, it cannot
categorically preclude reimbursement for treatment of a particular
disease or medical syndrome. In an interesting case involving a
recipient's claim for reimbursement of the cost of sex reassign-
ment surgery, the court held that a state policy of refusing to cover
such surgery violated the above regulation.54
As a fourth limitation, states must design their programs to as-
sure that medical "care and services will be provided in a manner
consistent ... with the best interests of the recipient."S5 This limi-
tation has not been used extensively either to uphold or invalidate
state agency action, but is nonetheless important.56 Although this
requirement does not impose an affirmative duty on the state to
provide the best medical treatment available, it at least requires
that a state provide some safeguards to ensure that recipients will
receive needed medical care.57
Finally, even though a state may make reasonable regulations
and policies governing its Medicaid program, these regulatory ac-
tions must be consistent with the objectives of the federal pro-
gram.58 The objectives of the program are expressed in the
51. Id. at 1155.
52. But see Ledet v. Fischer, 548 F. Supp. 775, 786 (M.D. La. 1982) (The amount,
scope, and duration requirement was held applicable only when the service
at issue was mandatory, not optional.). For a discussion of judicial interpre-
tations of 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b), see Butler, State Limits on the Amount, Scope
and Duration of Services Under Medicaid, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 456, 457-58
(1977).
53. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (1983).
54. Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980). But see Curtis v. Taylor, 625
F.2d 645, 653 (5th Cir. 1980) (state policy of limiting benefits for physicians'
services to three visits per month did not violate federal requirement).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1982).
56. At least one court has used this limitation. See Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp.
1072, 1081 (D.N.H. 1976) (holding that a state regulation restricting Medicaid
reimbursements for medically "unnecessary" abortions "ignores the statu-
tory mandate of Section 1396a(a) (19) that medical services are to be offered
in 'the best interests of the recipients' ").
57. One commentator has offered the explanation that states must provide "care
which is responsive to the problem for which it is offered." Butler, The Right
to Medicaid Paymentsfor Abortion, 28 HASTINGS UJ. 931, 955 (1977).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17) (1982). This stipulation applies even if a state re-
quests a waiver of a program requirement. 42 C.F.R. § 431.55 (1983).
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preamble of the statute: to enable each state, "as far as is practica-
ble.... to furnish medical assistance... [to those] whose income
and resources are insufficient to meet the cost of necessary medi-
cal services." 9 Medication legislation, therefore, imposes a duty
on states to provide medically necessary care.
IV. MEDICAL NECESSITY: A FUNDAMENTAL
REQUIREMENT
The purpose of the Medicaid program is to provide medical
assistance to persons unable to afford necessary medical care.6 0
Although Congress does not explain what it means by "medically
necessary" care in the statute's preamble,61 the statute itself ex-
pressly obliges states to implement procedures to control the use
of "unnecessary" services. 62 Requiring a state to provide medi-
cally necessary treatment remains an important safeguard against
the unlimited use of a state's discretionary power.
In 1972, Congress repealed a statutory provision 63 that had pre-
vented reductions in total annual state expenditures under Medi-
caid,6 4 So that states could reduce the scope of optional services
they offered. In that same session, Congress-in response to the
unanticipated economic drain on the states-repealed the statu-
tory requirement that states move toward providing comprehen-
sive care.65 Some commentators have contended that these
actions indicate a congressional intent to grant nearly absolute
control over the Medicaid program to the states.66 This interpreta-
tion, however, is inconsistent with the legislative history accompa-
nying the repeal of these sections. The authorization to reduce
expenditures applied only to optional Medicaid services, and in no
way affected the delivery of basic mandatory services. 67 Also, the
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982). The effect of this preamble of determinations of medi-
cal necessity is beyond the scope of this Article.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982). As one commentator explained, "[tihe program was
in response to widespread problems of poor quality and low availability of
medical services for the indigent." Note, supra note 25, at 1491 n.2.
61. See Note, supra note 25, at 1496.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (1982).
63. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(d) (1970), repealed by Pub. L No. 92-603, § 231, 86 Stat. 1410
(1972).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(e) (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 230, 86 Stat. 1410
(1972).
66. See, e.g., Note, supra note 25, at 1494-95 (these congressional actions "ex-
panded state discretion to limit Medicaid coverage; this commentator con-
cluded that states were not required to fund all medically necessary
services).
67. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 100, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4989, 5086.
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relaxation of the goal to provide comprehensive care was to be
merely a temporary stay, as the goal would be reinstated once the
state program had achieved fiscal stability.68 There was no inten-
tion to abandon all federal control; rather, the revisions were sup-
posed to foster more uniformity of treatment among recipients of
the program. Therefore, Congress never intended to turn absolute
control over to the states, and the goal of providing medically nec-
essary care remains an important part of the program.
Medical necessity has been called a "red herring," a term with
no substance;69 yet, courts have considered the words worthy of
interpretation. In Beal v. Doe,70 the Supreme Court upheld a
Pennsylvania regulation denying Medicaid payment for non-thera-
peutic abortions.71 The Court concluded that Medicaid legislation
required only that regulations be reasonable and consistent with
the objectives of the Act.72 Because the state's interest in encour-
aging childbirth was reasonable, an abortion, not necessary for the
preservation of maternal life or health, was unnecessary.73 The
Beal majority admitted, however, that a more difficult question
would have arisen had the state tried to eliminate coverage for
medically necessary abortions.74
Several years before the holding in Beal, the Court had struck
down certain procedural requirements of a Georgia abortion stat-
ute as unduly burdening the constitutional right to an abortion as
defined in Roe v. Wade.7 5 In Doe v. Bolton,76 the Court defined
medical necessity as the medical needs of the patient "in light of
all the factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and
... age-relevant to the well-being of the patient."77 It is unclear
whether the Beal court adhered to this definition,7 8 yet the "Bolton
definition" continues to be viewed as an important Supreme Court
interpretation of the term medically necessary care.79
Medical necessity remains an important counter-balance to a
68. Id.
69. See Butler, supra note 57, at 954.
70. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
71. An abortion was deemed medically necessary if the continuance of the preg-
nancy threatened the life or health of the mother or resulted from rape or
incest, or if there was medical evidence that an infant would be born physi-
cally or mentally impaired. Id. at 441 n.3.
72. Id. at 444 (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17) (1982)).
73. Id. at 446.
74. Id. at 444.
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
77. Id. at 171.
78. For a summary of the arguments over whether Beal adopted the Bolton defi-
nition, see Note, supra note 25, at 1496-97.
79. See Butler, note 57, at 957.
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state's broad discretionary powers. The issue is, therefore, how
best to determine whether a particular medical treatment is neces-
sary. Existing federal and judicial mechanisms do not adequately
address this issue.
V. EXISTING PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS FOR
DETERMINING THE MEDICAL NECESSITY
OF PROPOSED TREATMENT
When a recipient wishes to have medical expense reimbursed
and a particular treatment is not covered by a state plan, either
through oversight or because of an explicit policy of exclusion, the
recipient may want to compel the state to cover the expense of the
desired treatment. The law, both statutory and judicial, provides
only a few avenues for a recipient to pursue. All of these avenues
suffer problems of inaccessibility, inadequacy, or bias.
A. The Fair Hearing
A state plan must provide an opportunity for a fair hearing
before the agency "to any individual whose claim for medical
assistance under the plan is denied."8 o The initial evidentiary
hearing must meet all the due process requirements of Goldberg v.
Kelly, 81 including notice, opportunity to present evidence and
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to representation by coun-
sel or another party.82 If the decision is adverse to the recipient,
there is a right to appeal to the state agency,83 and ultimately to
the courts. 84
The fair hearing would seem to provide an appropriate avenue
for a recipient who wishes to challenge a denial for reimburse-
ment. Such a hearing, however, may not be available to recipients
under such circumstances. The requirement for a fair hearing is
triggered only if an agency action is adverse to a recipient.85 Regu-
lations define an adverse action as "a termination, suspension, or
reduction of Medicaid eligibility or covered services." 86 An initial
refusal to reimburse the cost of a particular medical procedure not
previously covered by a state plan may not fall within the ambit of
this definition.
Even if the fair hearing were available to a recipient challenging
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (3) (1982).
81. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
82. 42 C.F.R. § 431.205 (1983).
83. Id. § 431.232(b)-(c).
84. See infra note 129.
85. 42 C.F.R. § 431.200 (1983).
86. Id. § 431.201.
[Vol. 63:835
DETERMINING MEDICAL NECESSITY
a denial of reimbursement, this procedure would still be inade-
quate for the purpose of determining whether the requested care
was "medically necessary." In a fair hearing, the recipient bears
the burden of proving the necessity of the requested medical treat-
ment.87 This burden is contrary to the implication embodied in the
federal statutes and regulations, 88 and puts an unfair burden on
the recipient.
B. Review Organizations
In 1972, Congress amended the Social Security Act to require
states to institute a system of peer review of medical providers and
institutions.89 Congress created the Professional Standard Review
Organization (PSRO) to promote the efficient and economical de-
livery of health care, and to ensure reimbursement of services
"only when, and to the extent, medically necessary, as determined
in the exercise of reasonable limits of professional discretion."90
The local PSRO could control medical necessity by assisting the
local agency in developing regulations and guidelines governing
reimbursement,91 or by approving (or denying) individual re-
quests for costly or elective treatment.9 2 PSRO legislation also
provided an appeals process, which begins with the statewide peer
system review council, and then goes to the Secretary of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, and finally ends in the
courts with ultimate judicial review93 of the Secretary's findings.94
This scheme seemed to place a determination of medical necessity
squarely within the power of the PSRO.95 However, the PSRO sys-
tem has recently been replaced by the Utilization and Quality Con-
trol Peer Review Organization (Organization).96
The Organization system has redefined the function and focus
of review in an attempt to remedy the perceived inability of the
87. See infra notes 139-146 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
89. Pub. L No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320c (1982)).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c(1) (1982).
91. Id. § 1320c-4(a) (1) (A).
92. Id. § 1320c-4(a) (2) (A),(B).
93. Id. § 405(g). See infra note 129.
94. Id. § 1320c-8.
95. The regulatory language led one commentator to conclude that "the statute
unambiguously places the responsibility for making such a determination [of
medical necessity] on Professional Standard Review Organizations
(PSRO's)." Note, Determination of Medical Necessity: Medicaid Funding for
Sex Reassignment Surgery, 31 CASE W. RES. 179, 185 (1980).
96. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2113(a), 95 Stat. 794 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320c (1982)).
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
PSRO to control costs. 97 An Organization now functions primarily
to review professional activities98 and to develop professional
norms of care, diagnosis, and treatment based on typical patterns
of practice in the area.99 A recipient who is dissatisfied with a de-
termination is entitled to the same review process as was previ-
ously available, 00 but the new posture of Organizations indicates
strongly that when medical necessity and cost containment con-
cerns collide, the latter will prevail. The Utilization and Quality
Control Peer Review Organization is, to state in simple terms, un-
duly biased towards cost considerations when considering the
medical necessity of requested treatment.
C. Utilization Review Committees
A participating state is required to have some mechanism for
reviewing the adequacy and appropriateness of the care provided
to Medicaid patients. This reviewing function may be provided
either by an Organization, as described above, or by a separate en-
tity.' 0 ' These utilization review committees provide an institution-
ally focused safeguard against the unnecessary use of services
and, in turn, ensure the cost effectiveness of a state program.
Their sole function is to judge the economic efficiency of an institu-
tion.10 2 They are, therefore, inaccessible to an individual who
wishes to challenge an agency's refusal to reimburse the cost of
medical services. 03
97. See Lang, supra note 13, at 720.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a) (1) (1982).
99. Id. § 1320c-3(a) (b).
100. Id. § 1320c-4. See also notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
101. 42 C.F.R. § 456 (1983).
102. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. See also GAO Report, No.
HRD-83-74, MEDICARE & MEDICAIn GuIDE (CCH) 33,407 (1983).
103. An individual is not only barred from approaching a utilization review board
for a determination of the medical necessity of proposed treatment, but is
also prevented from constitutionally challenging a decision of the board. In
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 993 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a
class of Medicaid patients in a nursing facility could not challenge the proce-
dural inadequacy resulting from facility-initiated discharges and transfers.
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, found that the class of patients had failed
to establish the requisite "state action" in the decisions to transfer or dis-
charge patients, since those decisions were made through the facility's utili-
zation review board. The Court concluded that the state was not responsible
for those decisions, in spite of the fact that the review board operated under
state regulations which, in turn, were promulgated under the Medicaid stat-
ute. Id. The Court also shrugged off the fact that the state responded to the
review board decisions to transfer and discharge patients by adjusting the
patients' Medicaid benefits. In rejecting the patients' fourteenth amendment
claims of due process, the Court blanketed the utilization review board in an
immunity to constitutional challenge.
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D. The Courts
Occasionally, courts have determined whether a particular pro-
cedure or item of care should be reimbursed under a state Medi-
caid plan. 0 4 Many of these cases attack the validity of specific
regulations that preclude most payments for optional services,
such as drug treatment, 0 5 prescription eyeglasses, 0 6 or
abortions. 07
In Beal v. Doe, 0 8 the United States Supreme Court upheld a
state exclusion from coverage of non-therapeutic abortions. While
the Court explained that the decision between the patient and doc-
tor is not conclusive of reimbursibility, the Court stated that the
determination must be given some weight. 0 9 Although the state
exclusion was upheld, the Beal majority said that serious statutory
questions would have been raised had the state plan excluded nec-
essary medical treatment.110 Unfortunately, the Court did not give
any indication as to how a court could distinguish necessary from
unnecessary medical care."'
Lower courts, however, have attempted to define medically nec-
104. Jurisidiction in a federal court has usually been based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1982). Such jurisdiction apparently requires that the plaintiff allege a sub-
stantial constitutional claim, so that the statutory claim can be heard by the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction. The statutory claim does not require the
convening of a three-judge panel, but may be disposed of by a single justice.
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974). Absent a substantial constitutional
claim, the district court may lack jurisdiction under § 1343 to hear only the
statutory claim. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S.
600, 618-23 (1979). However, cases have been heard under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982) that claim only the violation of the federal statutory mandate. See, e.g.,
Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1981); Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546
(8th Cir. 1980). These cases involved a review of regulations that could be
invalidated only if arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. It is doubt-
ful that a direct challenge to compel payment by a state agency, absent a
specific regulation excluding such payment, could be sustained as an exer-
cise of federal question jurisdiction. State courts, of course, are always avail-
able to the recipient.
105. Vogel v. Blum, MEDICARE & MEDICAID (CCH) 32,203 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) (State
Medicaid Agency's standard of excluding nonessential and ineffective drugs
from reimbursement was upheld from the charge that it violated recipients'
civil rights.).
106. White v. Beal, 413 F. Supp. 1141, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (invalidated a state regu-
lation that limited the provision of eyeglasses under the state Medicaid plan),
a'd, 555 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 1977).
107. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
108. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
109. Id. at 445 n.9.
110. Id. at 444. Since the adoption of the "Hyde amendment" making federal fund-
ing unavailable for most elective abortions, the Supreme Court has held that
a state plan may properly exclude even necessary abortions. Harris v. Mc-
Rae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
111. The issue of restricting the funding of medically necessary services did not
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essary treatment. Two cases of special interest both addressed the
same issue: whether a state policy of denying reimbursement for
the surgical treatment of gender dysphoria is contrary to the intent
of the Medicaid program and, therefore, invalid. The cases
reached different conclusions and, in the process, characterized
the determination of medical necessity differently.
In Pinneke v. Preisser,"12 a recipient challenged a state's policy
of denying reimbursement for the cost of sex reassignment sur-
gery. The court held that the policy arbitrarily denied coverage
solely on the basis of diagnosis, type of illness, or treatment," 3 and
thus violated the regulatory ban on such limitations."14 The policy,
the court said, established an irrebuttable presumption that the
surgery was not medically necessary, and reflected a complete dis-
regard for the patient's condition, the physician's judgment, and
the standards of practice in the medical community."15 The court
held that the determination of what is medically necessary rests
with the recipient and physician, not with clerical personnel and
government officials.116
The test used by the Pinneke court is a simple one to apply:
medically necessary treatment is that which the recipient and the
physician request. This test, however, ignores the discretion given
to the states to reasonably limit the scope of the Medicaid pro-
gram," 7 and sets no limit on the demands recipients may make of
a state program. Most importantly, the court made its own finding
that surgery was the only appropriate treatment for the recipient's
disorder, despite evidence that psychotherapy could also amelio-
rate the condition."8
In Rush v. Parham,"9 the court rejected the argument that
Georgia's refusal to reimburse the cost of sex reassignment sur-
gery was a violation of the requirement that Medicaid cover the
cost of medically necessary treatment. The court concluded that
the refusal was not inconsistent with federal legislation as a matter
of law, and thus denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judg-
arise in Beal, as the regulation at issue only restricted funding for allegedly
unnecessary abortions. Id. at 441 n.3. See also Note, supra note 25, at 1496.
112. 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980).
113. Id. at 549. The court concluded that the treatment logically fell within the
scope of mandatory services, particularly in-patient and physician services.
Id. at 550.
114. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (1983).
115. Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980).
116. Id. at 550.
117. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970).
118. Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980).
119. 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1981).
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ment.120 The court reasoned that while a physician's opinion is im-
portant, it is not controlling on the question of whether the
treatment is a medical necessity. The Rush decision thus recog-
nized that the state has a role to play in determining whether re-
quested care is necessary.' 2 ' The court would allow a state to
exclude procedures which it deemed to be experimental or man-
ageable through alternative means. 22 Upon remand, the lower
court concluded that the state's policy of refusing reimbursement
for such surgery was not a violation of the federal statute; the court
reasoned that surgery was not necessary for the treatment of this
disorder, in light of the available psychotherapeutic alternative. 23
The Pinneke and Rush cases demonstrate that judicial determi-
nations of medical necessity are bound to be inconsistent. Courts
have differing views of the purpose of the Medicaid program, as
well as the role the state agency should play in determining cover-
age. In addition, the recipient-as plaintiff in a lawsuit-bears the
burden of proving that the requested treatment is medically neces-
sary. This is contrary to the burden implied in legislative and reg-
ulatory language. 2 4 The judicial process is also costly and time-
consuming. Therefore, the courts are not the preferred arbiter in
the determination of medical necessity.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY REFORM
The Medicaid program needs a uniform procedure for resolving
disputes between a recipient and a state agency regarding the
medical necessity of requested treatment. Such a procedure
should fulfill several goals. It should be accessible to the recipient
and not unduly burdensome to the state agency, either procedur-
ally or economically. It should afford the recipient adequate proce-
dural due process and should balance the recipient's interest in
obtaining medical care against the state's interest in reasonably
limiting the medical care it must reimburse. The following propo-
sal is an attempt to incorporate these goals into a statutory
provision.
120. Id. at 1156.
121. Id.
122. Id. The "experimental" exclusion is not specifically mentioned in either the
statute or the regulations promulgated under Medicaid; yet, the court ac-
cepted this as a valid exclusion without discussion. Perhaps the court analo-
gized decisions of medical necessity to the determinations of "reasonable and
necessary" care which the Secretary of Health and Human Services makes
under Medicaid. See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
123. Rush v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 856, 863-65 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
124. See infra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
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A. The Proposal
If the recipient and the attending physician agree that a proce-
dure is necessary for the medical diagnosis or treatment of the in-
dividual, and the state regulations do not allow reimbursement for
this procedure, the recipient can take the following steps:
1. The attending physician must document, with supporting
clinical evidence, the necessity of treatment.
2. The recipient must be seen by a second physician not origi-
nally involved with the individual's medical care, but who is
familiar with the proposed method of treatment.125 If the
consulting physician agrees that the procedure is medically
necessary, a presumption arises in favor of the recipient.
3. The local agency can deny a request for reimbursement
only upon a clear showing on the agency record that the re-
quested treatment is medically unnecessary. This determi-
nation must be made in consultation with medical advisors.
Lack of medical necessity may be demonstrated by a clear
showing that the requested procedure is experimental, un-
safe, or not accepted by the medical community or by any
other standard adopted by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, as applicable in 42 U.S.C. § 1395Y.126 Deci-
sions must be made within thirty days of filing the request,
and the recipient must receive prompt notice of the refusal
as well as a full explanation of the reason for refusal. The
recipient must also be allowed access to the file and agency
record upon request.
4. If the decision of the local agency is adverse to the individ-
ual, the recipient may then request a de novo review by the
state hearing officer, and will be permitted to submit any ad-
ditional clinical evidence to support the claim. The finding
and conclusions of the hearing officer must be made in con-
sultation with medical advisors, and the decision justified
on medical grounds, by the same standards and under the
same burden of proof as are binding on the local agency.
Determinations must be made within thirty days of filing
the request. The recipient must receive prompt notice of
the decision and a full explanation of the reasons for a
denial.
5. If the decision of the hearing officer is adverse to the recipi-
125. The consultation, itself, would be a reimbursible event.
126. The statute states, in relevant part, "no payment may be made... for any
expenses incurred for items or services ... which.., are not reasonable and
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury...." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(a) (1) (1982).
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ent, a review by the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices may be requested, as described in 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4.12 7
6. Judicial review, as described in § 205(g) of the Social Secur-
ity Act128 will be available if the decision of the Secretary is
adverse to the recipient.129
B. Explanation of the Model
1. Initial Decision by the Recipient and the Donor
The initial decision on medical necessity is made by the recipi-
ent in consultation with the attending physician. There is some
statutory support for this. Freedom of choice is still guaranteed by
the program, 3 0 and the Medicaid statute provides that care must
be provided in the best interests of the recipient.'3 '
The medical judgment of the physician, while not conclusive, is
a factor of considerable importance. 3 2 The issue to be resolved is
the medical necessity of a procedure. It follows that the medical
judgment of the attending physician must be given considerable
weight.
2. The Concurring Opinion
Administrative use of a second medical opinion is not a revolu-
tionary idea. The Massachusetts Medicaid plan, for example, re-
127. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
129. In 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Social Security Act provides for judicial review of all
"claim[s] arising under" the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), to the exclusion of the
exercise of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Al-
though a question remains as to the scope of the "arising under" language of
§ 405(h), see Annot., 42 A.I..L FED. 484 (1979), a recent Supreme Court opin-
ion provides a partial answer. In Heckler v. Ringer, 52 U.S.L.W. 4547 (May 14,
1984), the Court assumed without deciding that § 405(h) did not foreclose
mandamus jurisdiction in all claims arising under the Medicare Act. How-
ever, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, concluded that where
§ 405(g) clearly provides an adequate remedy to a Medicare claimant to chal-
lenge all aspects of a decision of the Secretary, then it also provides the ex-
clusive avenue for judicial relief; thus, a party aggrieved of a decision of the
Secretary must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial
relief. I& at 4551. In so deciding, the Court reaffirmed the broad interpreta-
tion of the "arising under" language of § 405 (g) first articulated in Weinberger
v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1975) (constitutional challenge to the denial of
benefits by operation of the duration-of-relationship eligibility statute was
claim arising under Title 11 of the Social Security Act and, therefore, within
the meaning of § 405(h)). See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 327
(1976) (no federal question jurisdiction where claim challenges denial of wel-
fare benefits on the basis of administrative procedures).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (23) (1982).
131. Id. § 1396a(a)(19).
132. See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549-50 (8th Cir. 1980).
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quires a recipient who requests reimbursement for certain surgical
procedures 133 to obtain a second independent medical opinion on
whether the procedure134 is deferrable. 3 5
While the Massachusetts program does not require that the
consulting physician agree with the initial medical evaluation,136
this proposal presumes that the consultation process will only be
used when the medical procedure is relatively new and unfamiliar;
therefore, this proposal requires agreement between the consult-
ant and the consulting physician. Requiring agreement among
physicians introduces an element of community standards into the
decisionmaking process, 37 without making the procedure unduly
burdensome to the recipient or to the state administrators.
3. The Presumption
The presumption which arises after consultation in favor of the
recipient is an important part of this proposal. All other proce-
dures138 have improperly placed the burden of proof on the indi-
vidual requesting reimbursement. The purpose of the Medicaid
program has been-and continues to be-the provision of neces-
sary care to those eligible for coverage. 3 9 Since the essential pur-
pose of the legislation is to provide medical care, it places an
133. MAss. ADnaN. CODE tit. 106, §§ 450-450.312 (1978), promulgated under MASs.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. l1BE (West Supp. 1983). These procedures requiring a
second independent judgement are: tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy, cho-
lecystectomy (removal of gall bladder), hemorrhoidectomy, hysterectomy,
disc surgery and spinal fusion, joint cartilage removal and menisectomy, sub-
mucous resection or rhinoplasty (reconstruction of nose) or repair of nasal
septum, and removal of varicose veins. MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 106, § 452.302
(1978).
134. MASS. AnMin. CODE § 452.301 (1978).
135. Under the Massachusetts program, surgery is not deferrable when postpon-
ing the procedure for six months or more is likely to jeopardize the patient's
life or essential function or cause severe pain. Id. § 452.300.
136. The Code states:
It is not necessary that the consultation(s) rendered through the
Program confirm the non-deferrability of the surgery in order for
providers of medical and hospital services to be reimbursed. It is
only necessary that the recipient go through the Program's process
to obtain the medical judgments concerning the surgery's defer-
rability. The decision as to whether to undergo the surgery in ques-
tion is the recipient's and his/her physician's.
Id. § 452.301.
137. In Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 448 (1977), the Court left open the issue of
whether a state abortion statute (requiring a second, concurring opinion that
the procedure was medically necessary), would infringe on the physician's
exercise of independent medical judgment, in a way not contemplated by
Medicaid legislation.
138. See supra notes 80-122 and accompanying text.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
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undue burden on a recipient to prove, first, eligibility for coverage
and, then, eligibility for reimbursement for the type of care he or
she wishes to receive. In these two requirements, the recipient's
burden of proof should be restricted to producing two physicians
who deem the care necessary.
As a general principle, presumptions are created in light of fair-
ness and probability.140 A medicaid recipient cannot be expected
to have access to any medical evidence beyond that which the two
physicians put forth. If the local or state agency is trying to deter-
mine the relative safety or medical acceptability of the proposed
procedure, the recipient can hardly be expected to have the exper-
tise to defend the treatment choice, or the resources to produce
additional medical evidence.14 1 In a determination of the relative
merits of a medical procedure, the party best able to rebut the pre-
sumption is the state, which has ready access to medical advisors.
The presumption of medical necessity would have the effect of
shifting the burden of persuasion to the state agency. 4 2 A statu-
tory presumption must create a rational connection between the
basic fact and the presumed fact. 4 3 So long as a rational connec-
tion exists, the presumption is consitutional, even though it im-
poses the burden of persuasion upon the party against whom it is
being directed.144 In the proposed presumption, the basic fact (the
professional judgment of two independent physicians) is ration-
ally related to the presumed fact (the medical necessity of the
treatment). The presumption, therefore, meets the test of
constitutionality.
The state can overcome the presumption by a showing of lack of
necessity. This showing must flow from something other than cost
considerations. Regulations currently allow reasonable limits for
140. 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 301.02 (2d ed. 1976).
141. Id.
142. FED. R. Evi. 301 adopts the view that a non-statutory presumption in a court
case shifts only the burden of going forward onto the opposing party.
143. Mobile J. & K.C.R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910) ('That a legisla-
tive presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a
denial of due process of law or a denial of equal protection of the law, it is
only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed ... ."). In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court addressed a statutory presumption
that a mine owner incurred civil liability for a worker's black lung disease if
the individual had been employed in the mine for ten or more years. The
Court held the presumption constitutional under the Turnipseed analysis.
Id. at 28.
144. See, e.g., Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959) (State law
presumed that insured's death was accidental, and thus placed the burden on
the insurer to prove that death resulted from suicide.).
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reimbursement based upon medical necessity or cost,14 implying
that the two are separate and distinct. While cost considerations
cannot be ignored completely in any agency determination, they
should not form the basis of the decision when the issue is the
medical necessity of treatment. If the medical necessity of treat-
ment is established, cost factors could then influence such details
as the length of hospital stay or the type of institutional and pro-
vider care required.
The lack of necessity, therefore, must be justified on medical
grounds, in consultation with medical specialists. States are now
required to establish medical advisory boards to assist in the ad-
ministration of their programs;146 and any state that has an organi-
zational review system already deals with a consulting group
composed primarily of health care professionals.147 Medical advi-
sors are, therefore, already an accepted part of the plan. Involving
medical experts in the determination of medical necessity takes
the decision out of the exclusive control of "clerical personnel or
government officials." 4 8
If the justification for refusal must be medically based, what are
appropriate grounds? The Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices decides similar issues under the Medicare standard that cov-
erage should be excluded if care is not "reasonable and
necessary." 49 Under this standard, the Secretary has refused cov-
erage if a procedure is experimental, unsafe, or not accepted by
the medical community based on statistical and scientific evi-
dence.150 These criteria are medically based and focused on the
benefit or harm which can accrue to the recipient.
Medicaid decisions have been based on Medicare rules in the
past.'51 Both programs provide medical assistance and both are
administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
145. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1983). Cf. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp.
781, 786 (E.D. Va. 1977) (twenty-one day limitation on in-patient hospital care
deemed "reasonable" in light of state's attempts to make cutbacks in
spending).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (9) (A) (1982). At present, medical committees are
merely advisory; failure of a state agency to consult a committee is not con-
sidered to be a violation of the federal statute. Mississippi Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v.
Heckler, 701 F.2d 511, 523 (5th Cir. 1983). The proposal set forth in this Article,
however, would make consultation with the medical committee mandatory.
147. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
148. Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1) (A) (1982).
150. For an examination of the standards used in evaluating reimbursement for
several treatments, see Medicare Coverage Issues, MEDICARE & MEDICAID
Gum (CCH) % 27,201 (1976).
151. See Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1156 (5th Cir. 1980); Lang, supra note 13, at
722.
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The statutory and regulatory language to be interpreted is also
similar. It is therefore consistent that Medicaid decisions on medi-
cal necessity apply the same criteria used in Medicare decisions
under the test of reasonable and necessary care.
The adoption of the parallel criteria would also have practical
benefits. Under this proposal, the Secretary would ultimately hear
claims on appeal from the states. If the same criteria were used,
the expertise of the Department would be applied consistently to
all claims. Also, Medicare determinations are a matter of record
and, therefore, are publicly available. 52 States could use past
Medicare decisions as guidance for their own determinations to
bring local determinations into conformity with the Secretary's
opinions. Thus, the number of appeals to the Secretary would be
kept low. The criteria a state would apply when justifying a refusal
to reimburse a medical procedure, therefore, would be the same as
those used by the Secretary when interpreting similar statutory
language.
4. Local and State Level Determinations-Due Process
Fulfilled
The interest at stake in this proposal is an important one. No
need is so compelling as the need for medical care; so it would
seem at first glance that this procedure would require a full eviden-
tiary hearing as prescribed in Goldberg v. Kelly. 153 Yet, due pro-
cess is a flexible concept and "calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands." 54 In Matthews v. El-
dridge,5 5 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that due process
required a full evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of So-
cial Security disability benefits. Since the majority of the claim-
ant's proof was in the form of medical data and clinical evidence,
the Court held that a paper hearing would suffice.
Resolution of the constitutional sufficiency of an administrative
procedure requires an analysis of the government and private in-
terests at stake. 56 In Matthews, the Court considered three dis-
tinct factors: (1) the private interest that would be affected by the
152. MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 27,201 (1976).
153. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Goldberg Court required that before termination of
welfare benefits, the claimant should be afforded adequate notice detailing
the reasons for the termination and an effective opportunity to defend by con-
fronting adverse witnesses and by presenting his or her own argruments and
evidence orally before the decisionmaker. Counsel may be present if the
claimant desires but need not be furnished.
154. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (upholding the due process right
to a hearing upon revocation of parole).
155. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
156. Id. at 334.
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official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that inter-
est by the procedures prescribed and the probable value, if any, of
additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental inter-
est, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional procedures would entail.5 7
In determining medical necessity, the private interest in secur-
ing the requested care is high. The recipient is presumably con-
vinced that the desired care is essential to his or her physical well-
being. The type of proof upon which the determination win rest
and the presumption in the recipient's favor, however, minimize
the risk of erroneous deprivation. A full evidentiary hearing would
not afford the recipient a significant advantage, since objective
medical data is usually unbiased and best presented in written
form. Also, the proposed statutory presumption requires that the
agency come forward with rebutting evidence, so the recipient has
little to gain by being given the opportunity to confront witnesses
and refute testimony.
On the other hand, both the recipient and the state have much
to lose if a full trial-type hearing were required. Evidentiary hear-
ings cost both time'5 8 and money. The recipient's interest is of a
nature such that expeditious decisions are desirable, and the gov-
ernmental interest in preserving agency time and money is well-
documented.159 As neither party would be served by an eviden-
tiary hearing, the proposal meets the constitutional standard of the
Matthews Court.
The proposed procedure gives the recipient notice of denial and
the opportunity to present initial evidence in the form of physi-
cians' reports or any additional evidence. The recipient also must
be given the reasons for denial of the request and access to the full
agency record. These requirements provide adequate procedural
safeguards against the denial of due process. 1 60
5. Appeal to the Secretary and Judicial Review
The power of the Secretary to impose procedural require-
ments161 and substantive limitations 162 on state Medicaid plans is
well established. The present system of Organization 63 review
and its predecessor, the PSRO,165 both prescribe an appeal to the
157. Id. at 334-35.
158. Id. at 341-42.
159. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
160. Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 346 (1976).
161. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
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Secretary and limited judicial review.165 Thus, the notion of the
Secretary as final arbiter is not new to the Medicaid program.
But can the national administrator of the Medicaid program be
expected to make any better decision about medical necessity
than the individual state agencies? If present Medicare deci-
sions166 are any indication, the Secretary has the access to medical
expertise and the capacity to make sound, reasonable medical
judgments. If this trend were to change dramatically, the political
process would force the Department to be accountable for its
change of philosophy and-if Medicaid recipients were uniformly
affected nationwide-pressure could be brought to bear on the De-
partment more easily than it could be on fifty separate states.
The uniformity that the proposal imposes on the states is both
appropriate under the legislative scheme and advantageous to the
recipient. Judicial review as provided in this proposal would not
consist of a de novo determination. Section 205(g) of the Social
Security Act provides that "the findings of the Secretary as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."' 67
Under this standard, courts may not substitute their own judgment
for that of the Secretary; rather, courts must only review the rec-
ord for such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support the Secretary's conclusion.168 Limiting the
scope of judicial review would minimize the occasion for substan-
tially inconsistent judicial definitions of medical necessity,169 and
would also make the role of the judiciary in the Medicaid program
consistent with its role in other programs within the Social Secur-
ity Act. 70
VII. CONCLUSION
The Medicaid program grants broad discretion to a state to tai-
lor its program, but this discretion is limited primarily by the re-
quirement that a state program provide its recipients with
"medically necessary" care. Although medical necessity defies
substantive description, it is possible to prescribe a procedure that
a state must use when a recipient and an agency disagree on the
necessity of requested care. The proposal for federal statutory re-
165. See supra notes 93-94 & 10O and accompanying text.
166. MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 18,240 (1983).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). See supra note 129.
168. Richards v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
169. See supra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
170. In addition to the Disability Insurance program of Title II of the Social Secur-
ity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982), limited judicial review is provided in the
Supplemental Security Income program of Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)
(1982), and the Medicare program, 42 U.S.C. §1395ff(b) (1982).
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form sets forth a procedure that is relatively uncomplicated and
accessible to the recipient, and that does not unduly burden pro-
gram administrators. As medical technology continues to develop
newer, better, and perhaps even cheaper methods of diagnosis and
treatment than are currently available, determinations of medical
necessity will require case-by-case consideration. The foregoing
proposal presents one method for making those determinations.
